November 16, 1945 : X+1 – off Kyushu
…This morning the weather brought low clouds with a chance of rain and heavy kamikaze showers. Before that a wave of suicide boats made out from the many nooks on Koshiki-retto, through a dim pre-dawn haze. The 160th regiment of the 40th infantry division has been working to clear any threats from that island since X-4, together with Navy destroyers circling the jagged shore. Much ordnance has been expended against the rocks there, blasting any suspicious looking crevice which might hide a small ship. But there are a great many crevices and clearly some of the deadly boats survived.
Kamikaze planes were expected at the first bit of bad weather, but the risk from attack boats was supposed to be eliminated. Destroyer picket screens against incoming aircraft are well beyond Koshiki-retto from this invasion fleet. Just one destroyer was patrolling between our big ships and the island, and she was busy this morning just keeping them at bay from her own hull. The USS Charette claims five shinyo sunk, with another probable. That may have been most of them, but we know at least three more got through, because they found the cruiser USS Little Rock and my recent acquaintance the USS Red Oak Victory. The Red Oak was back to her old job of at-sea re-supply of ordnance to Navy ships. The Little Rock did her share of pre-invasion shore bombardment, and was to continue the job of delivering fire support after taking on more deadly packages.
The Red Oak Victory was parallel to the shore, less than two miles off, tethered to the Little Rock. Gunners on the Red Oak may have hit some of the attacking boats, but the Little Rock reports that two of them got close enough to blow big holes in her hull, possibly starting off secondary explosions in the holds, and put her under in a blink. It was all the cruiser could do to cut the transfer lines and get clear of the sinking ship so they wouldn’t smash any swimming survivors. Little Rock’s gunners barely caught a glimpse of a final suicide motorboat gunning past the rolling wreck. The boat closed the last few dozen yards to the Little Rock and its multi-hundred-pound bow charge ripped through the light cruiser’s armor. I have no word on fatalities from below, but one machine gun crew on deck reported injuries from wood splinters and impact from one severed human hand.
The Little Rock is still afloat, after a scary stretch of fire fighting and damage control work. As the news came in, I sat in my corner of the radio room with an angry knot in my stomach at the certain fate of so many of my friends from the hard-working Red Oak Victory. Radio traffic continued its steady professional cadence. Hold picket screen, do not adjust. Oakland to assist. Task two fleet tugs. Notify USS Comfort.
Radio calls picked up urgency as two radar pickets ships saw a swarm of objects at the same time. A loose mass of objects came at cloud level from the direction of Nagasaki . Dozens more stragglers spanned fifty miles behind the main body. It was just at first light , so our radar equipped night fighters were still on station. One at a time they braved the cloud layer to hunt by glowing scope. Flying singly in strict zones to avoid collisions, they would do little to reduce the pack.
Close flying through clouds is no picnic, even for veteran pilots. Our second line of picket ships reported at least one pair of wrecked planes tumbling down out of the clouds, probably after a mid-air collision. Minutes later the outer ring of destroyers in our invasion fleet opened up with radar-directed flak at the approaching mob. Other ships joined in before I heard excited Japanese from one of the radios which had been silent.
I ran outside to look, brushing aside a scolding ensign, who shut the hatch behind me. Scores of Japanese planes dropped down out of the clouds. Two dozen Navy fighters, up and ready from the early radar picket alert, were inbound from the west to meet them. Once the forces merged it would be impossible for ships’ gunners to target Japanese planes without endangering American pilots. This rarely stopped American gunners under kamikaze attack.
One Japanese plane broke out, faster than the others, directly at my ship. I didn’t run or even flinch. Some how I knew she was not meant for me. The Jap plane streaked along low and level, shifting sideways just enough to be difficult to hit. The pilot was cool and experienced. I could see that his plane had no bomb. He did have two U.S. Navy “Hellcats” on his tail. The Japanese plane tore over my ship and I recognized it as one of the newest types, a Shinden, faster and stronger than the famous Reisen “Zero” that gave the world so much trouble through 1942.
Behind the Shinden were the two American fighters. Behind those were three older Japanese Navy planes just coming into view, each with an oversize bomb slung below. Our F6s were almost upon the dodging Shinden, and the lead Hellcat tore into it, throwing .50-caliber slugs through its structure and making the engine smoke. The Jap pilot pulled up into a full 180 degree reversal, adding a half barrel roll near the top, keeping up airspeed along the way. The surprised American fighters started a long level turn to come around and finish their prey. But the lead Japanese pilot had done his job. His three followers stormed ahead free of opposing fighters. They weaved near wave top, daring Navy gunners to shoot so low they could hit other ships. Gunners did fire, from every angle, and shortly the left plane erupted into a shower of debris which scattered over the water. The other two bore on, absorbing minor hits, engines screaming.
Just 300 yards forward and to port of my ship was the transport USS Montrose, also carrying elements of the 5th Marine Division. Like us she was still full, waiting for the division to get orders ashore. With barely a dozen yards to spare, gunners on the Montrose found the right plane in the remaining suicide pair, causing it to break apart, but it was too late. Most of both planes plowed into the side of the lightly armored transport, the bomb from the damaged plane impacting somewhere below the water line. In a dramatic flourish the injured Shinden pilot finished his flaming dive directly into the superstructure of the rapidly listing transport.
The Montrose sank in eight minutes. The Third Battalion of the 28th Marines ceased to exist.
US Navy in-shore “flycatcher patrols” would not be made up of Destroyers. In the main they would be LCI(G) or LCS(L)3 working with PT-Boats.
Via Google books —
“U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History”
By Norman Friedman
In particular see –
Pages 251 – 252 — LCI(G) Gunboats for Olympic
The Navy wanted 400 gunboats for Olympic. It had 207 in May 1945 made
up of 125 LCS(L)3 and 82 LCI(G) of various makes.
The plan was for 200 more converted from 200 LCI(L) in the West Pacific.
It was only going to get 100 of those 200 with the balance staying
LCI(L) through Operation Olympic.
No LCI(L) were planned for use in the Olympic landings despite Adm
Barbey’s request to use them in order to reduce the threat to embarked
troops compared to APA, AKA or LST types.
However, the upshot here is that there would be 100 LCI(L) available
for for Operation Coronet to either replace gunboat casualties or
troop ship casualties (likely both).
Thanks for the comment!
It’s a point of detail that I would file into the “too much for a newspaper reporter” bucket. A line about ‘…and other small patrol craft’ could still be slipped into the final copy. But that also re-opens the question of how many ships of each sort would be left after the string of typhoons rolled through between August and X-day.
– sdm
There were going to be about 200 PT-Boats involved in Operation Olympic.
See —
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/CloseQuarters/index.html
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/CloseQuarters/PT-8.html
At Close Quarters
PT Boats in the United States Navy
by
Captain Robert J. Bulkley, Jr.
USNR (Retired)
with a Foreword by
President John F. Kennedy
page –441–
“The original plans for Operation Olympic, the projected invasion of the Japanese home islands, made no provision for PT operations. Subsequent to the drafting of the operation plan, however, the Commander Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet asked Commodore Bates to submit a plan for use of PT’s off Japan, and subordinate commanders of the Amphibious Force made requests on him to provide more than 200 PT’s for use in connection with the invasion. Hostilities ended before the plan could be submitted.”
and
Page 445
“26. THE END AND THE BEGINNING
In mid- August 1945, 30 squadrons of PT’s were in commission. Nineteen were in the Seventh Fleet, six in the Pacific Fleet, three were being reconditioned in the United States for Pacific duty after combat in the European theater, one was shaking down in Miami, and one was the training squadron at Melville. By the end of the year all had been decommissioned except Squadron 4, the training squadron, and the brand new Squadron 41. In addition there was Squadron 42, which had been fitting out in New York in August, and which was the only PT unit placed in commission after the end of hostilities.”
Close Quarters took that from the following document —
“An Administrative History of PT’s in World War II.”
[Better known as United States Naval Administrative History of World
War II #171, located in the Rare Book Room, Navy Department Library,
Naval Historical Center, Washington DC. Available in microfiche for
purchase, or it can be borrowed through interlibrary loan.]
Which has been digitized as “An Administrative History of PT’s in World War II” on the Fold3 service.
I lost track of the reference, as it wasn’t specifically cited in the book margins, but at least one senior Navy man wanted nothing to do with PT boats during Olympic. I didn’t get a count of how many did get put on the job.
However many small coastal patrol craft were in use, they still didn’t stop all the suicide boats from getting through and putting three holes in the side of the USS Guam on November 21st.
Speaking on the level of total numbers, Kyushu is listed as having 2101 miles of coastline, and I don’t think that source includes the islands and rettoes around it and to the south. A commander would have tough choices to make in how to focus the efforts of a few hundred small boats along 500 or 600 miles of coastline. By X+1 the focus may have shifted somewhat away from the outer islands, which had been supposedly gone over by then.
– sdm
The last bit on why this section regards Japanese suicide boats is wrong involved two items.
The first is “Brodie Device” to launch L-4 and L-5 observation planes from LST’s.
(See photo of Annex 6b to Field Order 74 Assignment of Shipping, I Corps (Tentative) pg. 1, Krueger Collection, Texas A&M in History Friday: Operation Olympic – Something Forgotten & Something Familiar, January 10, 2014
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/41192.html)
The second is Dr. Vladimir Zworykin’s television seeker adapted to the L-5.
See —
History Friday: Secrets of the Pacific Warfare Board — Block III TV in the Invasion of Japan, Fourth of an Occasional Series
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/44897.html
History Friday: Secrets of the Pacific Warfare Board — Block III TV in the Occupation of Japan, First of an Occasional Series, June 20, 2014
http://chicagoboyz.net/archives/43669.html
The 40th Infantry Division had the original Brodie device LST. That vessel’s crew and US Army artillery spotter plane pilots uncovered main Japanese Suicide boats base at Okinawa.
During Olympic the “USS Brodie’s” L-5’s would have Dr. Vladimir Zworykin’s television cameras with the 40th Division’s ACG command ship being equipped with a TV receiver for the L-5 camera.
The photograph pictured at the end of your article was actually a depiction of the kamikaze attack on the USS Kidd, painted by Paul Eckley at Eckley Aviation Art. His brother was stationed on this ship and Paul himself was a B-17 pilot in the early days of the Pacific Theater during WWII. This painting now hangs in the USS Kidd Museum in Baton Rouge LA.
Our hyperlink points directly to an offer of sale for that item. You are welcome!